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REMARKS ON THE NATURE 
OF JUSTIFICATION: 
A SOCIO-PRAGMATIC 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Simon Susen 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The main purpose of this essay is to reflect on the nature of justification. To 
this end, the analysis draws on Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s De la 
justification.  Les  économies  de  la  grandeur1  [On  Justification: Economies 
of Worth
2
]. More specifically, the article aims to examine the  extent  to which 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s conceptual framework, widely known as ‘the 
sociology of critical capacity’,3 permits us to demonstrate that processes of 
justification4 are vital to the symbolically mediated construction — that is, 
to both the conceptual and the empirical organization5 — of social life. In 
order to prove the validity of this contention, the inquiry explores the 
meaning of ‘justification’ in  relation  to  the  following  dimensions:  (1)  
existence, (2) ethics, (3) justice, (4) perspective, (5) presuppositions, (6) 
agreement, (7) common worlds, (8) critique, (9) practice and (10) 
justification itself. By way of conclusion, the article maintains that processes 
of justification constitute an essential ingredient of human reality. 
 
Keywords: Boltanski and Thévenot; justification; organization; pragmatic 
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SETTING THE SCENE 
 
Before  examining  Boltanski  and  Thévenot’s  sociological  approach  in  detail,   it 
is  worth  providing  a  concise  definition  of  the  concept  of  ‘justification’.  In the 
most general sense, the  term  ‘justification’  refers  to  the  act  of  providing reasons 
for  the  validity,  legitimacy  and  defensibility  of  (a)  an  action,  (b)  a belief and/or 
(c) a social arrangement. In other words, justificatory practices emerge in rela- 
tion  to  (a)  empirical  and  behavioural,  (b)  conceptual  and  ideological and/or  
(c) conventional and institutional processes and structures. 
It is striking, however, that, within the history of intellectual thought, most 
prominent accounts of justification — notably, their  philosophical  variants  —  tend 
to focus on its epistemological, rather than its sociological, dimensions. 
Consequently, they tend to conceive  of ‘justification’ in terms of  ‘the justification of 
beliefs’  [b], rather  than in  terms of  ‘the  justification  of  human actions’  [a] and/or 
‘the justification of social arrangements’ [c]. Among the most noteworthy, and also 
most  influential,  epistemological  theories  of  justification  are  the following: 
• infinitism,6 which posits that beliefs can be justified to the extent that they are 
situated within unlimited chains of reasons and reason-giving; 
• evidentialism,7  which argues that  beliefs  can be  justified  to the extent   that 
their cogency can be demonstrated on the basis of evidence, of which there are 
different forms; 
• externalism,8 which suggests that beliefs can be justified to the extent that 
they make reference to, and thereby implicitly or explicitly acknowledge their 
dependence upon, factors that are external to a person; 
• internalism,9  which sustains that beliefs can be justified to the extent that 
they can be defended by virtue of a subject’s internal states or  reasons;  
• coherentism,10 which affirms that beliefs can be justified to the extent that they 
cohere with other beliefs within a general system of beliefs, to which individual 
or collective actors subscribe in a regular, consistent and categorical manner; 
• foundationalism,11  which maintains that beliefs can be justified to the    extent 
that they correspond to a set of core underlying assumptions, upon which 
practices, convictions and norms are based and with respect to which they   can 
be vindicated; 
• foundherentism,12  which — as a combination of foundationalism and    coher- 
entism — contends that beliefs can be justified to the extent that they are 
embedded in a system of both foundationally constituted and logically inter- 
connected presuppositions. 
From a sociological perspective, justifications cannot be dissociated from the 
social contexts in which the actors providing them are situated and to which they  
make   implicit   or   explicit   reference.    Thus,   far   from   being   reducible  to 
 
  
 
 
 
merely epistemological matters, justificatory practices emerge in relation to and 
are embedded within (a) empirical and behavioural, (b) conceptual and ideolog- 
ical, as well as (c) conventional and institutional processes and structures. The 
fact that Boltanski and Thévenot’s De la justification. Les économies de la gran- 
deur13 [On Justification: Economies of Worth14] offers the  first fine-grained, 
multi-layered and systematic sociological account of the role of  justificatory 
practices in human life forms should be reason enough to take this oeuvre seri - 
ously. Drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot’s approach, the following sections aim 
to contribute to a socio-pragmatic understanding of ‘justification’ by focusing on 
10 key dimensions. 
 
 
 
1. THE JUSTIFICATION OF EXISTENCE 
 
The most fundamental form of justification is the justification of existence.  Its 
centrality is due to the fact that existence is the ontological precondition for the 
human being-in-the-world. As subjects capable of reflection and self- 
justification, we are able to give reasons for our actions, beliefs and convictions. 
The acceptability of the behavioural, ideological and institutional dimensions of 
our existence is conditional upon symbolically mediated processes of explanation, 
validation and confirmation. As interpretive beings, we constantly seek to make 
sense of different facets of the universe. We project hermeneutically assembled 
standards and values upon reality — not only in relation to ourselves, when 
immersed in the experience of our subjectivity, but also in relation to others, when 
participating in the daily construction of normativity. 
It is only insofar as our existence acquires a minimal degree of legitimacy that 
we are able to function within the potentially fragile boundaries imposed upon us 
by our reference groups within the wider context of society. ‘It is the question of 
the legitimacy of an existence, an individual’s right to feel justified in existing as 
he or she exists’,15 which is crucial to our ability to explore the objective, 
normative and subjective dimensions of our place in the universe. If we are 
deprived of approval and legitimacy, we are in no position to live meaningful lives 
supported by networks of recognition and sociality. Our right to justification16 
expresses our right to a self-determined mode of being, whose quest for autonomy 
cannot be dissociated from its confinement within varying degrees of heteronomy. 
If we lacked both the competence and the desire to justify ourselves for what we 
do, think and believe in, we would not be in a position to convert the daily 
experience of what is, and what is not, into the  challenge of reflecting and acting 
upon what ought, and what ought not, to be. The justification of our existence, or 
of particular aspects of our existence, constitutes a sine qua non of our capacity 
to attribute meaning to our lives. 
 
  
 
 
2. THE JUSTIFICATION OF ETHICS 
 
The justification of ethics — that is, the justification of the moral principles to 
which we subscribe as both emotionally and rationally motivated entities — is 
indispensable to our ability to participate in normatively codified interactions. To 
be sure, moral justifications can be provided in several ways: implicitly or 
explicitly, subtly or overtly, rudimentarily or elaborately, practically or theoret - 
ically, unconsciously or consciously, intuitively or discursively, and — often as a 
major source of controversy — a priori or a posteriori. The fact that we are moral 
beings — capable of making decisions and determining the course of our actions 
on the basis of ethical considerations — implies that ‘the imperative of 
justification’17 pervades our everyday practices, which are embedded in cultur- 
ally contingent forms of worldly immersion. Indeed, as ‘moral beings’,18 we are 
equipped with a ‘moral capacity’19 and, consequently, ‘capable of distancing 
ourselves’20 from the circumstances in which we find ourselves situated. While, 
as moral entities, we do not exist as free-floating subjects, we can call the nor- 
mative parameters underlying our own (or other people’s) actions into question 
and, if necessary, distance ourselves from them. 
Our moral dispositions cannot be divorced from the fact that we are 
perspective-taking creatures. As such, we have the ability to put ourselves in other 
people’s shoes, permitting us to relate to, to attach meaning to and to act upon 
reality not only in accordance with our own values, principles and convictions, 
but also, more significantly, through the eyes of our fellow human beings. A 
context-transcending attitude is built into the very heart of our moral condition: 
we are ‘moral beings capable of transcending the particularities’21 that, in many 
cases, prevent us from recognizing the empowering potential of our common 
humanity. As members of social groups, we have an interest in pursuing 
particular — that is, species-divisive — interests. As members of humanity, we 
have an interest in pursuing universal — that is, species-constitutive — interests. 
Of course, to the degree that there are multiple ways of defining ‘the common 
good’,22 it may be difficult — if not impossible — to make a case for the univer- 
salizability of moral claims to context-transcending validity. Irrespective of the 
scope of generalizability that can be attributed to a definite normative position, 
however, there is no doubt that the daily construction of morality constitutes a 
cornerstone of human society. 
 
 
 
3. THE JUSTIFICATION OF JUSTICE 
 
The justification of justice — or, to be exact, the justification of principles of jus- 
tice — is essential to shaping society in accordance with discursively established 
codes of normativity.23 Different ‘common worlds’24 are regulated by different 
‘principles of justice’,25  reflecting the spatiotemporally variable constitution   of 
 
  
 
 
 
moral values, even if those who advocate them may attempt to prove their uni- 
versal validity. 
Since the principles of justice and the worlds in which they are realized are not attached to 
persons or groups but are instead embedded in situations, everyone encounters situations in daily 
life that arise from the various systems of justice, and in order to behave with naturalness, 
everyone has to be able to recognize these situations and adjust to them. People in   whom this 
ability is lacking or impaired are deemed psychologically abnormal.
26
 
Thus, an individual’s a priori ability to develop ‘a moral sense’,27 which can 
be employed in order ‘to judge justly’,28 is contingent upon his or her pragmatic 
capacity to draw upon, to apply and — if necessary — to defend ‘principles of 
justice’
29 
in specific interactional contexts. The ‘definition of the common good’
30 
hinges on the particular social setting in which it emerges, as illustrated in ‘the 
development of the polity [cité] model’,
31 
which is founded on ‘the hypothetical 
construction of this competence’32 that allows for the production and reproduction 
of morally codified worlds. The principles of justice that undergird specific 
normative settings33 are constantly being negotiated and renegotiated by those 
whose embodied performances are shaped by them. Yet, to the extent that actors 
are equipped with ‘heterogeneous resources’,34 which are, by definition, unequally 
distributed and possess different use and exchange values in relation to the 
situations in which they are mobilized, the justification of justice — far from 
being reducible to an objective, let alone a disinterested, affair — is shot through 
with the normativity of asymmetrically constituted forms of sociality. 
The justification of justice, then, is — always and unavoidably  —  context-laden, 
value-laden, meaning-laden,  perspective-laden,  interest-laden,  power-laden and 
tension-laden. Regardless of whether one explores the normative constitution of the 
‘market’, ‘inspired’, ‘domestic’, ‘reputational’, ‘civic’ or ‘industrial’ world,35 each 
regime of action is maintained  by  a  series of  ‘principles of justice’.36  While these 
principles of justice can be endorsed consciously       or unconsciously, deliberately 
or unwittingly, explicitly  or  implicitly,  they  concern a wide range of normative 
issues, notably the following: 
— mechanisms of alienation, exploitation, discrimination and marginalization   in 
the market world;37 
— processes of asymmetrically structured valorization in the inspired world;38 
— practices of empowerment and disempowerment, emanating from a  stratified 
— and commonly gendered — division of labour, in the domestic world;39 
— strategies designed for the acquisition of symbolic power in the reputational 
world;40 
— collective acts of discussion, argumentation and deliberation in the civic 
world;41 
— disputes concerning the overarching rationality guiding purposive perfor- 
mances in the industrial world.42 
 
  
 
 
The justification of justice, along with the denouncement of injustice, can be 
considered vital to the production and reproduction of interactionally viable — 
and, hence, normatively codified — realities. To be sure, the justification of jus- 
tice may involve the justification of injustice, especially in cases in which ‘a series 
of ethical oppositions corresponding to a cosmological model in order to justify 
the hierarchy’
43 
can be reinforced in the name of those who  benefit directly or 
indirectly from the asymmetrical structuration of society. The emergence of 
conceptual or empirical pecking orders manifests itself in the construction of 
spheres of injustice,44 whose sustainability rests on their performative capacity to 
obtain suitable degrees of acceptability in a universe of constantly shifting 
frameworks of normativity. 
 
 
 
 
4. THE JUSTIFICATION OF PERSPECTIVE 
 
The justification of perspective is particularly important in pluralistic societies, in 
which actors are expected to defend their views, opinions and principles when 
exposed to those who do not share their ways of conceptualizing, relating to and 
engaging with reality. Behavioural, ideological and institutional differences 
between individual and collective actors are not only a hallmark but also   a 
civilizational driving force of highly differentiated societies. The more complex a 
given social formation, the more pronounced its polycentric constitution and the 
more eclectic the normative parameters by which it is supported turn   out  to  be.  
Different  social  arenas  — irrespective  of  whether  they  are called champs or 
cités
45  — are  structured in accordance with different sets  of norms, stakes and 
frictions, whose socio-ontological significance is articulated in context-specific 
struggles over access to resources, power and capital. 
It would be erroneous, however, to reduce regimes of social interaction to 
domains of conflict and competition, thereby overlooking the existential weight 
of the meaning-seeking and meaning-exchanging performances that actors 
accomplish in their everyday lives when driven by specific motifs and when aim- 
ing for empowering levels of comprehension, based on the implicit or explicit 
recognition of their epistemic stances and positions. On this account, ‘various 
forms of worth’46 can be conceived of as ‘various ways of embodying others — 
that is, of duplicating others in one’s own person (standing in for them, identi- 
fying with them, and so on)’47 — and, hence, of looking at, engaging with and 
acting upon reality, or particular aspects of reality, through the intersubjective 
experience of relating to others. Such a multi-pragmatist approach stresses the 
importance of ‘paying careful attention to the diversity of forms of justifica - 
tion’,48 which are indicative of the perspectival complexity permeating internally 
heterogeneous social formations. 
 
  
 
 
 
5. THE JUSTIFICATION OF PRESUPPOSITIONS 
 
The socio-ontological significance of the justification of presuppositions can be 
grasped by paying ‘attention to critical operations’
49 
undertaken by  human actors 
in particular contexts. In this respect, situations of dispute, crisis or confrontation 
with unexpected circumstances are especially noteworthy, as they oblige actors to 
reflect upon the presuppositions that they usually take for granted and by means 
of which they participate in the largely intuitive construction of social life. 
When endeavouring to understand the justification of presuppositions, the 
following two levels of analysis are of paramount importance: (a) the level of 
everyday interactions and (b) the level of science.50 With regard to the former, 
there are multiple ‘interpretive principles brought to bear by the actors’51 within 
their lifeworlds. With regard to the latter, there are numerous ‘explanatory prin- 
ciples used in the social sciences’.52 In relation to the former, it is crucial to rec- 
ognize that ‘the modes of justification or criticism used by actors’
53 
are vital to the 
normative construction of social life. In relation to the latter, it is imperative to 
acknowledge that ‘the descriptive languages or explanatory principles used  by the 
social sciences’54 are central to the analytical reconstruction of social life. It is no 
less important, however, to take into consideration that both of these epistemic 
levels have a presuppositional structure — that is, both reflexive scientists and 
ordinary actors have to draw upon taken-for-granted assumptions and socio-
linguistic background horizons when attributing meaning to reality. In fact, their 
epistemic ambitions share several basic objectives: both experts and laypersons 
have the capacity to describe, to analyse, to interpret, to explain and to assess 
specific aspects of reality.55 All human actors draw upon their epistemic  
competences,  irrespective  of  whether  they  do  so  from  the  endogenous 
viewpoint of the ‘insider’ or from the exogenous viewpoint of the ‘outsider’.  
When examining the construction of social life, one may place emphasis on 
the role of violence,56 just as one may draw attention to the role of justification.
57 
The former is fundamental to Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’,
58 
whereas the latter 
is essential to Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’.59 The relationship 
between these two approaches has been extensively discussed in the literature.60 
In relation to the former, one may wish to focus upon particular modes of violence: 
symbolic or physical, sporadic or structural, behavioural or institutional, 
disorganized or organized, overt or hidden, real or imagined. In relation to the 
latter, one may aim to centre upon particular modes of justification: ordinary or 
scientific, informal or formal, practical or theoretical, utilitarian or deontological, 
contextually motivated or ideologically driven. 
Just as all of these types of violence and all of these types of justification can 
be directly experienced and mobilized by ordinary actors, they can be scruti- 
nized and studied by scientific researchers. Regardless of whether they are expe- 
rienced, mobilized, scrutinized or studied,  there are no practices of violence and 
 
  
 
 
no practices of justification without presuppositional background horizons. One 
may have good reason to prefer the potentially constructive power of justifica- 
tion to the potentially destructive power of violence. The decision to favour ‘the 
forceless force of the better argument’61 over ‘the forceful force of enforced 
force’62 requires converting critical reason,  rather  than  arbitrary  power,  into the 
motivational cornerstone of civilizational development. Even if one defends the 
epistemic strength of critical reason against the self-referential force of arbitrary 
power, however, one needs to concede that the justification of presuppositions is 
inconceivable without a set of presuppositions underlying the very process of 
justification. 
 
 
 
6. THE JUSTIFICATION OF AGREEMENT 
 
The justification of agreement fulfils a pivotal function in both small-scale and 
large-scale variations of action coordination. In fact, ‘the relation between 
agreement and discord’63 is central to subjects’ capacity to engage in decision- 
making processes, enabling them to generate more or less stable life forms, to 
whose existence the emergence of relatively predictable patterns of action and 
interaction is indispensable. 
Democratically organized societies are unimaginable without the basic 
pluralistic rule that people need to be prepared to agree to disagree. While this 
rule is, for the most part, implicitly followed, it may be explicitly invoked — 
especially in tension-laden situations characterized by a lack of mutual 
understanding, respect and tolerance. Actors subscribing to the fundamental 
conventions of a democratic system, then, have to be both able and willing to 
accept that they cannot agree on every single issue. While making decisions — 
which may have individual or collective, small-scale or large-scale, short-term or 
long-term consequences — actors tend to realize that the significance of both their 
agreements and their disagreements can vary to a considerable degree, depending 
on the objective, normative or subjective weight attributed to each of them. 
Especially among Habermasian scholars, it is common to assume that one    of 
the key functions of human language is to permit subjects capable of speech and 
action  to  reach  discursively  sustained  agreements  with  one  another.64  Of 
course, this ‘peculiarly narrow focus on language use as essentially a means of 
coming to agreement about states of affairs in the world and what to do   about 
them’65  is problematic to the extent that it draws attention away from other crucial 
functions of linguistic utterances. In fact, the constative, regulative, expressive 
and   communicative   functions   of   language   —   epitomized   in   the distinctly 
human   capacity    to    raise    objective,    normative    and    subjective    validity 
  claims  when   engaging   in   symbolically   mediated   actions   oriented    towards 
 
  
 
 
 
intelligibility — are preconditions for people’s ability to reach discursively con- 
stituted agreements with one  another. 
There is no agreement without understanding. In this respect, three levels of 
understanding are especially important: 
(a) understanding in the cognitive sense of comprehending something (Verstehen 
eines Tatbestandes); 
(b) understanding in the intersubjective sense of comprehending someone else’s 
assertions (Verstehen einer Aussage); 
(c) understanding in the empathetic sense of comprehending someone else’s 
motives, feelings or situation (Verstehen eines Mitmenschens).66 
The picture becomes more complex if we distinguish between the following four terms, which 
are etymologically interrelated: Verstand, Verstehen, Verständigung and Einverständnis. As a 
species, we have learned to make use of reason (Verstand) and to reach different levels of 
comprehension  (Verstehen)  by  learning  to  communicate  with  one  another  (Verständigung) 
and,  if  necessary,  reach  agreements  with  one  another  (Einverständnis).  All  four  practices  — 
that is, reasoning, interpreting, communicating and agreeing — are conceivable only as (a) cog- 
nitive, (b) intersubjective and (c) empathetic dimensions. As a species, we have learned to rea- 
son, interpret, communicate and agree with one another by developing (a) the  cognitive capacity 
to argue with and against one another, (b) the intersubjective capacity to socialize  with one 
another and (c) the empathetic capacity to feel for one another. Far from being reducible to a 
merely semantic argument, the awareness of the etymological affinity   between Verstand,  
Verstehen,  Verständigung  and  Einverständnis  is  vital  to  appreciating  the  civilizational 
significance inherent in the power of human  understanding.
67
 
Hence, the most robust justification of agreement as a socio-ontological cat- 
egory can be found in its arguably most fundamental anthropological function, 
which consists in making society — understood as an ensemble of deliberating 
subjects — possible in the first place. Our capacity to reach agreements with one 
another lies at the heart of our moral condition, which is inextricably linked to the 
aforementioned fact that we are perspective-taking entities. The ‘possibility of 
coordinating human behaviour’68 by virtue of agreement constitutes a daily 
process that emanates from the necessity of having to ensure that individuals — 
whose practices are embedded within particular behavioural, ideological and 
institutional patterns — can live with one another and do so with a sense of 
responsibility in relation to their natural and social environments as well as in 
relation to themselves. The ‘seeming plurality of forms of agreement’,69 emerg- 
ing in variegated regimes of action and justification, illustrates the normative 
complexity pervading highly differentiated societies. 
 
 
 
7. THE JUSTIFICATION OF COMMON WORLDS 
 
The justification of common worlds is crucial to the construction of social reali- 
ties  that  are  simultaneously  context-dependent and context-transcendent: they 
 
  
 
 
are context-dependent in the sense that they reflect the spatiotemporal specificity 
of behavioural, ideological and institutional arrangements — irrespective of 
whether they are foundational, contingent or ephemeral70; they are context- 
transcendent in the sense that they point at the orientational reference points 
shared by all members of humanity, who — notwithstanding their diverging social 
and political affiliations — are directly or indirectly involved in the unfolding of 
world history. 
Within  the  normative  parameters  endorsed  by  Boltanski  and  Thévenot’s 
variant of ‘pragmatic sociology’, particular attention is given to the context- 
dependent idiosyncrasies  conditioning  the  course  of  human  agency. As previ- 
ously stated, different ‘common worlds’71 are regulated by different ‘principles of 
justice’.72 Thus, the interactions that take place within ‘common worlds’ are 
embedded within normative grammars, which codify the social encounters that 
occur within them. To  the  degree  that  people  — for  the purpose of assessing 
themselves and one another —  ‘establish  equivalencies and ordering princi- 
ples’,73 they attribute meanings and  values  to  the objective, normative and 
subjective dimensions of their existence by mobilizing the symbolic and material 
resources that are available to them in specific environments. 
The homological relationship between ‘ordinary situations’74  and    ‘political 
philosophies’75 derives from the fact that the ‘constructions of a principle of order 
and of a common good’,
76  
which one can observe in the daily unfolding   of 
concrete and embodied practices in people’s lifeworlds, tend to correspond to ‘the 
abstract and systematic solutions proposed’
77 
by experts and researchers in 
scholarly realms of discourse, contemplation and  argumentation. 
— The former level illustrates that subjects capable of action, reflection and self-
justification are able to contribute to the development of ‘common worlds’ by 
drawing upon their power of judgement when participating in the objective, 
normative and subjective construction of reality. 
— The latter level demonstrates that the ‘classic works of political philosophy 
[…] offer systematic expressions of the forms of the common good that are 
commonly invoked in today’s society’.78 
Normative frameworks that are relevant to consolidating ‘grammars of the 
political bond’79 — in the broad sense of communicatively coordinated and dis- 
cursively constituted practices — ‘serve to justify evaluations of the degree of 
justness of a situation’.80 In order for an equivalence to be of general significance 
within a particular regime of action, however, the consensus upon which   it is 
built needs to be ‘established at a higher level’81 — that is, at an epistemic level 
at which an argument,  or a set of arguments, is considered  acceptable     by 
everyone who contributes to the hermeneutically mediated creation of a situation. 
Regardless of whether one grapples with the normative constitution of the 
‘market’,  ‘inspired’,  ‘domestic’,  ‘reputational’,  ‘civic’  or  ‘industrial’ world,
82
 
 
  
 
 
 
each regime of action is sustained not only by a series of ‘principles of justice’,83 
but also by individual and collective experiences of a ‘common world’. A com- 
mon world is, literally, a world that people have in common. As such, it fulfils the 
socio-ontological function of a collective reference point or, to be precise, of a set 
of shared reference points, whose interconnectedness allows for the emergence of 
meaning-laden practices embedded in relationally structured contexts. ‘Common   
worlds’  may  be  described  as  cités,  which  designate  ‘normative  supports  for  
constructing  justifications’.84   As  cités,  ‘common  worlds’  represent symbolically 
organized realms whose functioning depends on the perpetuation of normative 
principles, which can be challenged, and even transformed, if considered both 
desirable and necessary by those whose practices contribute to their existence. 
Common worlds are, by definition, contextually constituted. Both their repro- 
duction and their transformation hinge on the ‘situated judgement’85 of those who 
create, and constantly recreate, them. ‘[T]he imperative to justify requires that 
each person be assigned a legitimate qualification’,86 whose judgements  may 
either confirm or undermine the implicit or explicit definition attached to a given 
situation. It is important to stress, however, that a ‘test of worth cannot    be 
reduced to a theoretical debate’,87 since it ‘engages persons, in their bodily 
existence, in a world of things that serve as evidence, and in the absence of which 
the dispute does not have the material means for resolution by testing’.88 Far from 
being reducible to a sterile exchange of abstract concepts disconnected from social 
reality, the construction of normative orders constitutes a relationally contingent 
process shaped by embodied actors whose arguments, concerns and 
preoccupations are rooted in concrete experiences of everyday   life. A common 
world is a world that we share, shape and structure with others as semantically 
equipped, discursively motivated, psychophysically organized and 
spatiotemporally situated beings. ‘In order to agree on what is just, then, human 
beings must be acquainted with a common good, and they must be meta- 
physicians’.
89 
In order for them to reach an agreement on what is liveable, human 
entities have to be immersed in a common world, obliging them to take on the role 
of performatively present participants. An actor whose common world lacks 
justification is tantamount to a creature without a raison d’être. 
 
 
 
8. THE JUSTIFICATION OF CRITIQUE 
 
The justification of critique is vital to actors’ capacity to distance themselves from 
taken-for-granted assumptions, while being able to provide reasons for their 
acceptance or rejection of particular states of affairs. To be sure, the justification 
of critique is no less central to social life than the critique of justification: the 
former permits actors to defend their judgements, evaluations and opinions; the 
latter  enables  actors  to  scrutinize  the  validity  of  the  reasons  given  in  support 
 
  
 
 
of their judgements, evaluations and opinions. As critical entities participating   in 
the quotidian construction of social life, we make judgements about judgements, 
offer evaluations of evaluations and form opinions about opinions. It is because 
genuine critique is prepared to criticize itself that the critique of justification 
constitutes an integral component of justified modes of criticism. 
Critique, then, can be regarded as a cornerstone of the very process of 
justification.
90 
In highly differentiated societies, ‘principles of justice’
91 
are 
increasingly diversified, requiring discursive processes shaped by people’s criti- 
cal capacity to adapt, and to be sensitive to, the spatiotemporal specificity of    the 
context in which they unfold. ‘Every differentiated society may be qualified as 
“complex”, in the sense that its members have to possess the competence needed 
to identify the nature of a situation and to navigate situations arising from 
different worlds’.92 Thus, rather than clinging on to an anachronistic ‘one-world 
model’,93 which is based on a monocentric conception of reality, critical social 
scientists, insofar as they seek to do justice to the complexity of advanced 
societies, need to embrace a cutting-edge ‘model of many worlds’,
94 
which is 
embedded in a polycentric conception of reality. 
Such a pragmatico-pluralistic conception of critique, however, in no way 
presupposes ‘a more or less automatic repetition of behaviours’,95 suggesting that 
every individual is logged into a mechanistic logic of cognition and action, 
determined by ‘an internal guidance system that works by means of a programme 
inscribed in persons in advance’.96 Rather, it illustrates the extent to which 
subjects capable of action, reflection and self-justification are in a position to 
adjust to different environments, to navigate their way through numerous settings 
within the social world and to cope with the normative imperatives thrown at them 
in the course of their lives. To be clear, this is not to posit that human actors always 
succeed in facing the challenges, let alone in resolving the problems, with which 
they are confronted in particular situations. Yet, this is     to recognize that, at least 
in principle, human actors have the capacity to take a critical stance in relation to 
the objective, normative and subjective dimensions of their existence. 
Although the room to maneuver is strictly limited by the way the situation is arranged, a  model 
incorporating several worlds gives actors the possibility of avoiding a test, of challenging a test’s 
validity by taking recourse to an external principle, or even of reversing the situation by 
introducing a test that is valid in a different world. The model thus includes the possibility of a 
critique for which determinist constructions fail to account.
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In other words, both the justification of critique and the critique of justifica- 
tion take place within particular contexts and can be effective only to the degree 
that they implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the behavioural, ideological or 
institutional parameters that underpin the specificities of the settings in which 
they are articulated. In order to assess ‘the validity of a test’
98 
and, if necessary, 
‘to denounce its injustice’,
99 
people have to be ‘able to extricate themselves 
from the grip of a situation’,100 thereby giving themselves the opportunity  to 
 
  
 
 
 
form ‘a critical  judgement’.101  This may require  them, however,  to commit 
to ‘opening their eyes to look at other worlds and at the beings that ensure their 
presence’.102 Indeed, they may have to cross-check the standards, values and prin- 
ciples which they intuitively apply in one set of circumstances, but which they may 
have to revise, or to abandon altogether, in another set of circumstances. In order 
to accomplish this, they need to be both able and prepared to acquire a level of 
flexibility that is strong enough for them to function within, and to adapt to, dif- 
ferent environments. In some cases, they may find this relatively straightforward 
or even stimulating; in other cases, they may find this rather difficult, if not bur- 
densome. In light of their ability to make choices based on critical judgement,  it 
appears that human actors possess a significant degree of ‘free will’: 
By using their ability to open and close their eyes, persons actualize their free will. […] But  the 
ability to open and close one’s eyes, to let oneself be caught up in the nature of the situation or 
to avoid doing so, is not manifested in critiques alone. It is also at work whenever persons have 
to complete the passage between situations arising from different worlds; in a complex society 
that includes multiple arrangements, this capacity is this indispensable to the normal conduct of 
daily life.
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People’s critical capacity, then,  is fundamental to the meaningful construction   
of different ‘worlds’. 
— In the ‘inspired world’,104 critique can serve as a driving force of creativity and 
originality, enabling actors to go beyond established patterns of tradition, habit 
and  conventionality. 
— In the ‘domestic world’,105 critique can serve as a driving force of  subversion 
and transformation, permitting actors to challenge consolidated mechanisms 
of gender-specific control, inequality and hierarchy. 
— In  the  ‘world  of  fame’,106  critique  can  serve  as  a  driving  force  of  will- 
and opinion-formation, allowing actors to assess the validity of relationally 
contingent codes of legitimacy by negotiating principles, standards and 
reference points capable of acquiring sustainable degrees of acceptability.  
— In  the  ‘civic  world’,107  critique  can  serve  as  a  driving  force  of practice- 
oriented coordination, giving actors the opportunity to deliberate over the 
desirability and sustainability of the social arrangements put in place within 
both the symbolic and the material boundaries of their life  forms. 
— In the ‘market world’,108 critique can serve as a driving force of innovation and 
productivity, bestowing actors with the capacity to make judgements, calcula- 
tions and predictions about the ways in which they compete with one another 
over labour and salaries, as well as over capital and profits, while participating 
in the production, distribution and consumption of goods and  services. 
— In the ‘industrial world’,109 critique can serve as a driving force behind  ratio- 
nally guided forms of economic organization, equipping actors with the 
capacity to challenge the preponderance of exchange value over use value, 
instrumental rationality over value rationality, profit-driven expansion over 
democratic control and cost-effective growth over human  development. 
 
  
 
 
In short, critique plays a pivotal role in shaping both the constitution and     the 
development of the multiple worlds constructed by social actors. 
 
 
 
9. THE JUSTIFICATION OF PRACTICE 
 
The justification of practice lies at the core of culturally codified life forms. It is 
central to ordinary people’s capacity to provide reasons for what they do and how 
they act in their everyday lives. Human beings have a need to justify their daily 
performances, routines and achievements. 
(a) As purposive entities, they are goal-oriented beings capable of justifying the 
aims and objectives they pursue when carrying out an action. 
(b) As normative entities, they are culturally codified and morally motivated 
beings capable of justifying the values, principles and standards to which they 
adhere when undertaking an action. 
(c) As subjective entities, they are mental and emotional beings capable of 
attributing meaning not only to the external world, by which they are sur- 
rounded, but also to their inner world, which they inhabit as self-aware and 
psychologically complex creatures able to reflect upon themselves before, 
during and after performing an action. 
(d) As communicative entities, they are intersubjective beings capable of reach- 
ing mutual understanding and, if necessary, agreements about their individ- 
ual and/or collective  actions.
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In brief, human beings are meaning-producing entities, who — while 
immersed in the interconnected worlds of objectivity, normativity and subjectiv- 
ity — are equipped with the species-distinctive capacity to engage in intersubjec- 
tive practices oriented towards the hermeneutic construction of spheres of 
intelligibility, which, as they navigate their way through social life, acquire 
variable degrees of justifiability. 
To be sure, the justification of practice is inconceivable without the practice 
of justification, and vice versa. There is no justification of practice without the 
practice of justification, because providing reasons for our actions constitutes a 
justificatory performance. There is no practice of justification without the justifi- 
cation of practice, because justificatory performances presuppose that, in princi- 
ple, at least a minimal level of epistemic validity and social legitimacy can be 
attached to, as well as obtained through, acts of reasoning-giving. 
Our ability to justify our actions demonstrates that reason-giving is itself a 
practice that is fundamental to the meaning-laden unfolding of  social  life.  From 
childhood onwards, we learn to provide reasons for our actions when justifying 
— or failing to justify — both the forms and the contents of our embodied 
performances.      ‘Validity-based   speech   has   allowed   us   to   transform   the  
Mund  (mouth)   of   the   animal   into   the   Mündigkeit  (responsibility)  of  the 
 
  
 
 
 
sapiens. It is from mouth to mouth that we have grown from Mund to 
Mündigkeit’.111 Put differently, our cognitive capacity to use our Verstand (rea- 
son) and our interpretive capacity to develop a context-specific sense of Verstehen 
(understanding) are inseparably linked to our communicative capacity  to  
participate  in  processes  of  Verständigung  (mutual  understanding).  Our path to 
maturity, autonomy and responsibility is intimately  interrelated  with our 
symbolically mediated involvement in society. In this sense, both the justifi- 
cation of practice and the practice of justification represent a never-ending 
accomplishment without which the consolidation of normatively structured life- 
worlds would be impossible. 
Thus, ‘[t]he model of justification’112  advocated by ‘pragmatic sociology’   is 
embedded in the practices of justification performed by members of society. ‘In 
fact, in order to face the world, people have to shuttle continually back and   forth 
between reflection and action, shifting constantly between moments of conscious 
control and moments in which the appeal of the present launches them into the 
course of events’.113 Rather than speculating about the allegedly transcendental 
logic of justification, the key task with which the ‘pragmatic  sociology of 
critique’114 finds itself confronted consists in exploring ‘the operations that form 
the weft of daily life’.
115 
Without the socio-ontological preponderance of our 
quotidian performances, both the justification of practice and    the practice of 
justification would be irrelevant to their principal point of reference: society. 
 
 
 
10. THE JUSTIFICATION OF JUSTIFICATION 
 
The justification of justification is essential to the legitimation of our existence as 
reason-giving entities.116 At first glance, this may appear to be a relatively 
insignificant issue synthesized in a tautological proposition. Given its centrality 
for the construction of normative life forms, however, it could hardly be more 
crucial to sociological analysis. As previously stated, our right to justification 
expresses our right to a self-determined life. To the extent that the right to justi- 
fication may be called into question, challenged or jeopardized, it needs to be 
defended not only by those who are — effectively or potentially — deprived of 
it, but also by everyone recognizing its anthropological significance. Yet, the task 
of justifying the right to justification is far from straightforward.117 This task 
cannot be accomplished unless we recognize that any attempt to make a case  for 
the right to justification is futile if it is artificially dissociated from the practices 
of justification in which it manifests its socio-ontological weight and through 
which human actors attribute meaning to different engagements with the world. 
Embarking upon such an ambitious undertaking, one may identify different forms 
of ‘justification’ on the basis of a typology of ‘engagements’.118 
 
  
 
 
I. One may classify ‘engagements’ in terms of their socio-ontological referen- 
tiality. Three types of engagement that are, respectively, embedded in three 
realms  of  existence  are  of  paramount importance: 
(a) Objective engagements are embedded in realms of objectivity. 
(b) Normative engagements are embedded in realms of normativity. 
(c) Subjective engagements are embedded in realms of subjectivity. 
 
In other words, human beings act upon, make sense of and construct the 
world on the basis of objective, normative and subjective engagements.
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(a) As physical beings, we are immersed in objectivity. As such, we engage 
with different elements of the natural world. Our bodies have a finite life 
span, are composed of various organic constituents and cannot be dis- 
sociated from the environment in which they are materially situated. 
(b) As social beings, we are immersed in normativity. As such, we engage 
with different elements of the cultural world. We possess species-con- 
stitutive faculties that have permitted us to build a human universe, which 
comprises a series of empowering resources — notably those derived 
from our productive, reflexive, socio-constructive, desiderative and 
experiential capacities. 
(c) As self-conscious beings, we are immersed in subjectivity. As such, we 
engage with different elements of our personal world. As individuals 
capable of developing a sense of identity, we are placed not only in an 
external world of objectivity and normativity but also in an  inner  world 
of subjectivity, to which we have privileged access. Both rationally and 
emotionally constituted processes of cognition — which are articulated 
in thoughts and reflections, as well as in moods and sensations — are 
part and parcel of what it means to be human. 
II. One may classify ‘engagements’ in terms of their socio-ontological condi- 
tioning. Three types of engagement that are, respectively, embedded in three 
types  of social conditions are  of paramount   importance: 
(a) Behavioural engagements are embedded in behavioural conditions. 
(b) Ideological engagements are embedded in ideological conditions. 
(c) Institutional engagements are embedded in institutional conditions. 
 
In other words, human beings act upon, make sense of and construct the 
world on the basis of behavioural, ideological and institutional 
engagements.
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(a) We engage in and with the world by virtue of different actions, which 
enable us to shape particular aspects of our existence. These actions 
 
  
 
 
 
may be categorized on several levels: individual or collective, conscious 
or unconscious, spontaneous or habitualized, reflexive or intuitive — to 
mention only a few. It is by virtue of our actions that we convert our- 
selves into the protagonists of our lives. 
(b) We engage in and with the world by virtue of different worldviews, which 
permit us to make ideologically shaped — and, hence, perspective- and value-
laden — assumptions about specific aspects of our existence. These worldviews 
constitute ideologies, in the sense that they reflect our interest-laden positioning 
in social reality, which is stratified in terms of key sociological factors — such 
as status, class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability. 
(c) We engage in and with the world by virtue of different institutions, which 
allow us to generate relatively solidified — and, hence, more or less 
predictable — patterns of social imaginaries and practices. These 
institutions — regardless of whether they are primarily economic, polit- 
ical, cultural, artistic, linguistic, sexual, educational, judicial, military, 
religious, scientific or otherwise — make us relate to the world in a 
socially organized and symbolically codified manner. 
III. One may classify ‘engagements’ in terms of their socio-ontological situated- 
ness. Three types of engagement that are, respectively,  embedded  in  three types  
of social fields are of  paramount   importance: 
(a) Foundational engagements are embedded in foundational fields. 
(b) Contingent engagements are embedded in contingent fields. 
(c) Ephemeral engagements are embedded in ephemeral fields. 
In other words, human beings act upon, make sense of and construct the 
world on the basis of foundational, contingent and ephemeral 
engagements.
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(a) Foundational fields constitute civilizational ensembles of relationally 
structured conditions the existence of which is necessary for the emer- 
gence of social order. Foundational engagements constitute activities 
that take place within, and unfold in relation to, foundational fields. 
These engagements are equally necessary for the emergence of social 
order. Unless human actors undertake foundational  engagements, social 
order collapses or does not come into existence in the first place. Obvious 
examples of both foundational fields and foundational engagements are 
those that are primarily (i) economic, (ii) political, (iii) cultural, (iv) 
artistic, (v) linguistic and/or (vi) sexual. No society can exist without (i) 
some degree of division of labour, (ii) small-scale and large-scale modes 
of value-guided action coordination, (iii) various forms of 
habitualization, (iv) diversified realms of aesthetic expression, (v) 
everyday spaces of communicative interaction and (vi) subtle or overt 
methods of regulating sexuality. 
 
  
 
 
(b) Contingent fields constitute societal ensembles of relationally structured 
conditions the existence of which is possible within, but not necessary 
for, the emergence of social order. Contingent engagements constitute 
activities that take place within, and unfold in relation to, contingent 
fields. These engagements are equally possible within, but not necessary 
for, the emergence of social order. By undertaking contingent engage- 
ments, human actors may shape, as well as experience, social order in   a 
meaningful fashion. Yet, in principle, the latter can exist and persist 
without the former. There are abundant examples of both contingent 
fields and contingent engagements, such as those that are primarily (i) 
judicial, (ii) military, (iii) religious, (iv) scientific, (v) academic  and/or 
(vi) journalistic. Society may be organized more or less efficiently with,  but 
can — at least in principle — exist without, (i) legal arrangements, (ii) 
armed forces, (iii) spiritual practices and sacred institutions, (iv) 
systematic forms of knowledge production, (v) disciplinary divisions of 
cognition and (vi) media industries. 
(c) Ephemeral fields constitute interactional ensembles of relationally struc- 
tured conditions the existence of which is largely irrelevant to the emer- 
gence of social order, although they tend to be far from meaningless to 
the actors by whose performances they are brought into being. Ephemeral 
engagements constitute activities that take place within, and unfold in 
relation to, ephemeral fields. These engagements are also largely irrelevant 
to the emergence of social order. Granted, by undertaking ephemeral 
engagements, human actors may contribute to the quotidian production 
and reproduction of social order in significant ways. Yet, in principle, the 
latter can exist and persist without the former. Given the diversity of 
everyday involvements in the world, one may identify a countless number 
of examples demonstrating the prevalence of both ephemeral fields and 
ephemeral engagements, which are, by definition, relatively short-lived 
and which, in terms of their typological specificity, are not indispensable 
to the reproduction, let alone to the emergence, of social order. 
 
Summary 
 
One may classify ‘engagements’ in terms of a combination of socio-ontological 
variables, notably in relation to the aforementioned dimensions.  Numerous  types 
of engagement that intersect with different socio-ontological variables are vital 
to human existence. As such, they can be constituted by an assemblage of the 
following — interconnected — modes of being-in-the-world: 
I. objective, normative and/or subjective; 
II. behavioural, ideological and/or institutional; 
III. foundational, contingent and/or ephemeral. 
 
  
 
 
 
These crucial modes of being-in-the-world have significant implications for a 
critical understanding of human existence: 
I. Human beings act upon, make sense of and construct the world on the   basis 
of objective, normative and subjective engagements. The domains of 
objectivity, normativity and subjectivity constitute the principal spheres in 
and through which human actors establish a materially constituted, 
symbolically mediated and personally assimilated relation to the world.  
II. Human beings act upon, make sense of and construct the world on the   basis 
of behavioural, ideological and institutional engagements. It is by virtue of 
their interactional, conceptual and organizational capacities that human 
creatures engage in and with the world in a performative, reflective and  
coordinative manner. 
III. Human beings act upon, make sense of and construct the world on the   basis  
of foundational, contingent and ephemeral engagements. The first type is 
necessary for, the second type is possible within, and the third type is 
irrelevant to the emergence of social order. 
As illustrated above, the task of shedding light on key forms of human 
engagement in and with the world is a complex affair. When navigating our   way 
through the universe, we pursue a large variety of conceptually distinguishable, 
yet ontologically intertwined, forms of engagement. As immersive entities, we 
cannot live in the world unless we act upon, make sense of and construct it. We 
cannot find our place in the world unless we engage in and with the multiple ways 
in which reality presents itself, and poses an existential challenge, to us on a daily 
basis. The challenge of engaging in and with the challenge of engagement 
remains, and will always remain, a challenge based on engagement. 
 
 
Engagements and Justifications 
 
Human beings provide justifications in relation to (I) objective, normative and 
subjective engagements, (II) behavioural, ideological and institutional engage- 
ments, as well as (III) foundational, contingent and ephemeral engagements. 
I. Human beings provide justifications by referring to objective conditions of 
existence (such as factual circumstances), normative arrangements of exis- 
tence (such as cultural specificities) and/or subjective interpretations of exis- 
tence (such as personal perceptions). 
II. Human beings provide justifications by referring to behavioural patterns of 
existence (such as interactional conventions), ideological representations of 
existence (such as conceptual arguments) and/or institutional assemblages of 
existence (such as organizational structures). 
III. Human beings provide justifications by referring to foundational realms of 
existence  (such  as  economic,  political,  cultural,  artistic,  linguistic    and/or 
 
  
 
 
sexual matters), contingent realms of existence (such as judicial, military, reli- 
gious, scientific, academic and/or journalistic affairs) and/or ephemeral realms 
of existence (such as situational and peripheral dimensions of their lives). 
Unsurprisingly, the challenge of justifying the right to justification is far from 
straightforward. The right to justification can be defended within different 
contexts, from different angles and on different grounds. Irrespective  of whether 
one favours a universalist perspective, according to which human beings are born 
with a set of rights, or a particularist perspective, according to which rights are 
invented by individual or collective subjects within spatiotemporally contingent 
contexts, the task of justifying the right to justification remains — and will always 
remain — a multifaceted challenge, not only in intellectual thought but also, more 
fundamentally, in day-to-day interactions. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As argued in this article, processes of justification are fundamental to the symboli- 
cally mediated construction — that is, to both the conceptual and the empirical 
organization — of social life. More specifically, they are central to individual and 
collective practices oriented towards the meaningful engagement with, and the 
purposeful involvement in, the world. Yet, processes of justification are just as 
complex within as they are vital to the production, reproduction and transforma- 
tion of quotidian realities. This inquiry has aimed to demonstrate the validity of 
this contention by exploring the meaning of ‘justification’ in relation to 10 key 
dimensions: (1) existence, (2) ethics, (3) justice, (4) perspective, (5) presuppositions, 
(6) agreement, (7) common worlds, (8) critique, (9) practice and (10) justification 
itself. In light of the preceding reflections, it becomes apparent that these aspects 
of justification play a pivotal role not only in sociological research but also, more 
fundamentally, in everyday life. For human socialization is inconceivable without 
processes of justification. To the extent that we, as rational beings, are expected to 
provide reasons for the validity, legitimacy and defensibility of the behavioural, 
ideological and institutional facets permeating our involvement in and exposure to 
different forms of material or symbolic actuality, processes of justification consti- 
tute an essential ingredient of human reality. 
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